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February 08, 2004
A theoretical Bush interview..
Posted by Jon Henke
(via a friend in the Washington Press corps) The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee suggests questions for Tim Russert to ask President Bush. Perhaps it's a good thing Tim Russert does his own research, because these Iraq-related questions don't pass the laugh-test.
Theoretical Bush answers.....
1. Mr. President, in your speech in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, which incidentally is still available on the White House website, you spoke of the grave danger regarding Iraq in very scary terms. You said: Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
A mushroom cloud — is very dramatic and powerful imagery Mr. President. Yet, in your State of the Union address you cited the Kay report and that it had found quote "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities" a far cry from a potential mushroom cloud. Isn't this sudden change in language, this change in emphasis regarding Iraq and WMD's coming from you and your administration since the Kay report came out, an admission that you misled the American people and the world regarding the reasons for going to war and that you have lost significant credibility with the America people on an issue that put our troops in harm's way? Theoretical Response from Bush: It appears that our intelligence was wrong about the degree to which those programs had advanced, Tim. But what do you think "WMD programs" lead to? WMDs. So, the threat may have differed in degree, but I fail to see how the threat differed in nature from the threat I described.
2. Mr. President, can you describe for the American people specifically what are "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities?" Are they the closest we've come to the real thing and is such a standard sufficient for pre-emptive war? If so, wouldn't we have a lot of wars to fight? Theoretical Response from Bush: I don't think I need to describe "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities", since David Kay has described them in great detail. You could even look it up, if you're interested. WMD-related programs are not sufficient, in themselves, but they are a part of the puzzle. This was far more complex than critics seem willing to concede, and we do nobody any favors by obstructive reductionism. More wars to fight? We approach each problem on its own merits, and you may notice it's been quite successful, lately.
3. Mr. President, it is clear from the Kay Report that either our intelligence was fatally flawed with respect to WMD's in Iraq or that you and members of your Administration overstated what the intelligence showed. This week, your CIA Director George Tenet, defended the CIA's pre-war analysis and said the agency never said that Iraq was an imminent threat. In recent days, your administration has distanced itself from the notion that the case for going to war was based on an imminent threat.
Yet, in your September 28, 2002 radio address, you referred to Iraq quote as an "urgent threat to America." Most reasonable people would find the words urgent and imminent synonymous with one another. On February 10, 2003 in response to a question your spokesman Scott McCllen said of Iraq "This is about imminent threat." Yet last month, McCllen said, "Some in the media have chosen to use the word 'imminent.' Those were not words we used." Mr. President, perhaps you can settle this issue which has damaged your credibility on Iraq — did Saddam Hussein, did Iraq, pose an imminent threat to the United States, or not? If not, what was the justification for the war in the first place? Theoretical Response from Bush: No, it was not an imminent threat. That's why I specifically called it a "grave and gathering threat"...not that critics seems to remember that. I also said we could not wait until the threat is imminent, but that seems to have escaped your attention, as well.
I'd define the North Korea problem as an "urgent threat" as well, but I don't define them as an imminent threat. There's a difference, and critics don't do the public any favors by trying to obscure our message behind their inferences.
Oh, and one more thing. That Scott McCllen line? "This is about imminent threat." He was referring to NATO's obligations to Turkey and the potential threat to them. I mean, c'mon people. Do your homework.
(Editor's note: This is either an egregiously lazy error on the part of the DSCC, or blatant dishonesty)
4. Mr. President, was your statement that Iraq was an "urgent threat to America" based on the analysis of the intelligence services and if so — is George Tenet lying today and will he be held accountable for either his analysis then or his statements now? And based on the Kay report, do you now regret terming the threat that Iraq posed to the U.S. as urgent? Theoretical Response from Bush: Well, my wife was the grade-school teacher, but I've picked up a few things along the way. Let's discuss words:
* Imminent: About to occur; impending
* Urgent: Conveying a sense of pressing importance
I think those differences speak for themselves. A criminal who lives in your neighborhood is an "urgent" danger. One who is at your doorstep with a gun is an "imminent danger". Next time, I'll bring along Laura. She's good at this sort of remedial education.
5. If no WMD's are ever found, which seems increasingly likely, will the costs of the war have been worth it — more than 500 Americans dead, thousands injured and maimed, and the loss of credibility for the U.S. around the globe? Theoretical Response from Bush: Yes, Tim. Very much so. The world has one less malevolent dictatorship and the Middle East has a wedge of freedom......a chance at stability. That is very clearly in the best interest of the United States.
I'd be VERY interested to know whether one of my opponents would claim that this situation is not in our best interests. If not, why? And how would they propose we begin to deal with the Middle East, their willingness to openly support terrorism, and their utter lack of fear of retribution if we are unwilling to actually DO anything about it.
I'd also be curious to know why so many of the critics saw the intelligence data prior to the war and came to the exact same conclusions as did my administration.
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