QandO

March 30, 2004

Diplomacy and law enforecment v. terrorism and state sponsorship
Posted by McQ

A little background that seems to be absent in many media reports when looking at the events leading up to 9/11. Again this is found in the 9-11 Commission’s interim report. This is important when we continue to hear how the previous administration gave countering terrorism such a high priority.

After suffering some disruption from his relocation to Afghanistan, Usama Bin Ladin and his colleagues rebuilt. In August 1996 he issued a public declaration of jihad against American troops in Saudi Arabia. In February 1998 this was expanded into a public call for any Muslim to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world.

As pointed out in another post, Bin Ladin and al Qaeda aren’t linked by the Clinton administration until 1997. That’s after his “relocation” to Afganistan. However, Bin Laden has been under scrutiny since before 1996.

During 1997 working-level State officials asked for permission to visit and investigate militant camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban stalled, then refused. In November 1997 Secretary Albright described Taliban human rights violations and treatment of women as “despicable.” A Taliban delegation visited Washington in December. U.S. officials pressed them on the treatment of women, negotiating an end to the civil war, and narcotics trafficking. Bin Ladin was barely mentioned.

Women and drugs take the top spot ... terrorism? Barely mentioned. At this time (Dec., 1997) Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have been identified as a “worldwide terrorist organization” by the Clinton administration (early 1997). Yet when our first contact with the Taliban regime then ruling Afganistan is made, Bin Laden is barely mentioned. How’s THAT for making terrorism “the highest priority?”

UN Ambassador Bill Richardson led a delegation to South Asia—and Afghanistan—in April 1998. No U.S. official of this rank had been to Kabul in decades. Ambassador Richardson used the opening to support UN negotiations on the civil war. In light of Bin Ladin’s new public fatwa against Americans in February, Ambassador Richardson asked the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin over to the United States. They answered that they did not control Bin Ladin and that, in any case, he was not a threat to the United States.

After months of heated internal debate about whether the step would burn remaining bridges to the Taliban, President Clinton issued an executive order in July 1999 effectively declaring that the regime was a state sponsor of terrorism. UN economic and travel sanctions were added in October 1999 in UN Security Council Resolution 1267. None of this had any visible effect on Mullah Omar, an illiterate leader who was unconcerned about commerce with the outside world. Omar had no diplomatic contact with the West, since he refused to meet with non-Muslims. The United States also learned that at the end of 1999 the Taliban Council of Ministers had unanimously reaffirmed that they would stick by Bin Ladin. Relations between Bin Ladin and the Taliban leadership were sometimes tense, but the foundation was solid. Omar executed some subordinates who clashed with his pro-Bin Ladin line.

Here’s the result of the “UN solution”. Pass resolutions and expect a regime who’s knowingly supporting terrorists to give them credence. No visible effect. So what’s the answer?

Do it again!

By the end of 2000 the United States, working with Russia, won UN support for still broader sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 1333, including an embargo on arms sales to the Taliban. Again these had no visible effect. This may have been because the sanctions did not stop the flow of Pakistani military assistance to the Taliban. In April 2001 State Department officials in the Bush administration concluded that the Pakistani government was just not concerned about complying with sanctions against the Taliban.

Reflecting on the lack of progress with the Taliban, Secretary Albright told us that “we had to do something.” “In the end,” she said, “it didn’t work. But we did in fact try to use all the tools we had.”

Of course, hindsight being 20/20, we now know that’s not true. We also know that about that time she wanted to give the Taliban a 'second chance'.

What was used were diplomacy and “law enforcement”. What the Clinton administration eschewed was the military and preemption (sorry folks, lobbing a few cruise missles doesn't fill the bill). Had they used the latter, no one can say for sure whether 9/11 would have been prevented or whether we'd have gotten Bin Laden. But by not using them, we can indeed point to the fact that 9/11 was NOT prevented and we MISSED a chance (another chance) to get Bin Laden.

To say they tried to use “all the tools” is just flat not true. They used all the tools they allowed themselves ... and were totally ineffective.

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