QandO

May 07, 2004

The Taguba Report
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The full report of Army Maj Gen Antonio Taguba is now available online. It seems fairly comprehensive, and unstinting in pointing out deviations from Army standards.

I'd welcome Jon and McQ to add their own views in this post as well, interspersing them or providing adddendums as appropriate.

The first thing that caught my eye was this:

The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the “guard force” be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police “do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.” The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.

Army Regulation 190-8 is a wise document. MI and MP missions are quite different, and often do not mesh well. In a correctional setting, the objectives of each side are often, in fact, wildly opposed.

The primary mission of the MP in a correctional setting is the smooth and peaceful operation of the facility. Subsidiary objectives to accomplish this mission include, but are not limited to:

• Preventing escapes


• Providing physical security for the prisoners


• Providing physical security for the MPs

Trouble brews any time the MI/MP wall is breached. The prison population must expect that complaints about safety issues or threats related to the MPs will result in improvement. But, once the MPs become involved in "psychologically preparing" prisoners for interrogation, the essential element of trust--not friendliness, you understand, but an expectation that the MPs will respond to eliminate threats to safety or security--is destroyed.

Once the prisoners know that the MPs are not impartial wardens, but active enemies, the mission of the MP force becaomes immeasurably more difficult. Prisoners become harder to control, requiring more rigorous methods of physical control.

In short, the less MPs are seen as unbiased wardens, the more likely it is that prisoner violence, or even uprisings, will occur.

Unfortunately, the report is clear that, at least at the lower levels, the MI/MP wall was breached, although It's not clear at what level.

While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels.

Translation: A failure of command. Look, if you let soldiers just get together and start making up their own rules as they go along, Bad Things will happen. That's why commanders have the responsibility to enforce standards.

Whatever those lower levels were, senior non-commissioned officers at that level, or officers at the next highest level should have caught it and stopped it.

At least they would have in a normal command. But Brig Gen Karpinski seems to have been a little...lax.

Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented.

Ah. Now the problem begins to get a little clearer. Translation, BG Karpinsky didn't feel like getting off her ass long enough to do anything other than rubber stamp what she knew she was supposed to.

And It wasn't just BG Karpinski, either. The Battalion level CO seems to have been a problem child as well.

With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this removal and search for a replacement was communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my military career.

When faced with an incompetent Battalion CO, BG Karpinski, in what is begining to appear to be her regular habit, did as little as possible, and what she did do, hid from her superiors.

Not that any of this is her fault, according to her.

During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.

Well, that's about as damning an indictment of any officer's fitness as any I could construct. But the whining's not over yet:

BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the MPs “ideas” that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.

Well, maybe if you'd run a command where you demonstrated to your subordinates that you actually cared about enforcing Army standards, BG Karpinsky, none of the abuse would have happened.

So, I'm now wondering, how often did BG Karpinski ever leave her air-conditioned office and take a stroll over to see how Col Pappas, Lt Col Jordan, Capt Reese, and MSgt Lipinski were doing?

Or what they were doing. Once? Fifty times? Or was it never, while she was content to sit in the big letter chair and sign orders whose intent and importance she had no intention of personally impressing upon her command?

And you know what happens when the CG doesn't enforce standards? Her staff and subordinates turn into a freakish circus act.

Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions.

Oh, and there's lots more. All of which paints a picture of a command that was allowed to go to seed.

MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons...Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and soft caps...Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced.

These weren't soldiers. They were a mob. Soldiers have discipline. But, Again, Karpinsky, like "The Secretary" in Mission: Impossible disavows all knowledge. And, it appears, rightfully so. Evidently, she didn't get out much at all.

BG Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.

Ah. Well, that answers my previous question.

What a sad collection of misfits and incompetents.

ADDENDUM (McQ): Taking Dale up on his kind offer let me throw this out for contemplation.

One aspect of this situation which has not gotten the play it deserves is the relationship between the 205th MI Brigade and the 800th MP Brigade as it pertains to Abu Gharib.

Prior to MG Taguba's investigation, there as an assessment made by another general, MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Forec Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). It was entitled "Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq." In that assessment, Miller's team, per the Taguba report, made the following recommendation:

With respect to interrogation, MG Miller’s Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that “sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees.” Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller’s team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated “it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.”

So here we have an assessment which says that it is the MI commander who "sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees”, and futher states "“it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.” Note, this assessment was made and presumably published PRIOR to the beginning of the abuses in question.

Sound like guidance to you? Me too. But its important to note that even if that were the recommendation or guidance, the Miller assessment also stated "the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence."

The whole reason I point this out is because the MPs claim it was the MI people who told them to "prepare" the prisoners for interrogation, which apparently they interpreted to do as they did, i.e. abuse the prisoners. It may be this assessment which gave the MI people the idea that they could and should involve the guards in this preparation. But it should be noted that while they may have followed that guidance, they obviously ignored (or didn't stress) the guidance which required them to provide "a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence."

So ... an important point from Taguba's report:

The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the “guard force” be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police “do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.” The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.

Which brings us to another general's assessment made prior to the disovery of the abuse. MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq. Ryder's team noted the following:

AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, require military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.

In other words, although the regulation doesn't allow it, there was apparently a "template" which had MPs "actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews" during Operation Enduring Freedom ... which is a no-no because, as noted, "[s]uch actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state". The maintenance of the prison population in that "docile" state is the main mission of the MPs.

But all that being said, note that per the Ryder assessement, the 800th MP Bde had not been directed to change its facility procedures for MI interrogations or to particpate them despite there being some history of that with the so-called 'template'.

Which brings us to the nut of the whole controversy.

Per MG Taguba's report:

While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels.

The salient questions? At what level was this decision made and by whom? How were the MI people involved? Did they use the recommendations of MG Miller's assessment as the basis of allegedly telling the guards to "soften up" the prisoners? Did the MI command structure of the MI Bde interpret Miller's recommendations the same way? Did they use them as a basis to involve the guards?

If so, there are some officers on the MI side of the house that need to be in the crap house as well. Because if this is what happened, then this misinterpretation of guidance (or perhaps a better way of putting it is the "selective" use of guidance where they accepted the "involve the guards" portion but ignored the "humane treatment" portion) can most likely be placed at MI Brigade's doorstep.

You might ask, "why haven't we heard that much about this at this time?"

Very simply, because of the complexity of the relationship (its hard to report on espcially when this mostly greek to most reporters), the sensationalism of the pictures and the obvious dysfunctional command relationship within the MP Brigade which was directly responsible for the treatment of the prisoners as has been seen around the world.

But the 205th MI Bde has dirty hands in all of this as well.

MG Taguba found the following ... and it is CRITICAL to understanding why what happend may have happened and why Karpinski, et. al, may have essentially washed their hands of the whole Abu Gharib establishment:

I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander’s Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR “SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION.”

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties.

So to summarize, we have an order which gives tactical command (TACON) of all MP units at Abu Ghraib to the commander of the 205th MI Brigade. As MG Taguba notes: "This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility." He also notes, [t]his is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties."

BIG point. Big enough that Taguba recommended:

That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Additionally, Taguba recommended:

That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

As I say ... watch this part carefully. This is a very strong recommendation from MG Tagabu. As it turns out, while the MPs at Abu Ghraib were officially TACON to the MI Bde, the command relationship was apparently ignored by both commands except when it was convenient to evoke it .... such as now when you see BG Karpinski trying to blame everyone else for her lack of leadership.

However Taguba noted:

Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON relationship.

Be that as it may, and regardless of her lack of leadership, Karpinski may have a valid complaint. As you can see above, there was conflicting guidance and a non-doctrinal command structure which conspired with weak commanders within the MP Bde and apparently within the MI Bde to allow this disaster to take place.

I have to agree with Karpinski in one reagard ... she's not the only one in this little fiasco who was derelict in their duty and she shouldn't "hang" alone.

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