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May 19, 2004 Strafor on Iraq Strategy A very interesting piece from Stratfor (subscription required) - a respected private intelligence firm - on the current situation and strategic necessities in Iraq. I'm not sure I entirely accept their premise, but it is a valuable piece. I'll excerpt a few bits, with comments. For starters, the author lays out his view of the strategic argument for the Iraq war...[emphasis added throughout] The United States' invasion of Iraq was not a great idea. Its only virtue was that it was the best available idea among a series of even worse ideas. In the spring of 2003, the United States had no way to engage or defeat al Qaeda. The only way to achieve that was to force Saudi Arabia -- and lesser enabling countries such as Iran and Syria -- to change their policies on al Qaeda and crack down on its financial and logistical systems. In order to do that, the United States needed two things. First, it had to demonstrate its will and competence in waging war -- something seriously doubted by many in the Islamic world and elsewhere. Second, it had to be in a position to threaten follow- on actions in the region.Here is where we begin to differ. We do so not based on what he wrote, but on what he left out - democracy. In fact, later, the author specifically disavows a strategic interest in Iraqi democracy. Iraq's only importance was its geographic location: It is the most strategically located country between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush. The United States needed it as a base of operations and a lever against the Saudis and others, but it had no interest -- or should have had no interest -- in the internal governance of Iraq.For starters, while I concur that we needed to show our resolve to the Arab world - to let them know we were no longer a "paper tiger" - I'm not entirely sure that direct military pressure will push the factionalized Saudi Arabia leadership in the direction in which we want them to go. Those in control are stuck between the United States on one side and the fundamentalists like Al Qaeda on the other side. I'd rather they believe Al Qaeda is their greatest threat - there is greater opportunity for detente when we share a common enemy. But let's leave that aside for now. Not only do I disagree on their view of our national interest in democracy, I disagree that we have "evolved to a new mission: the creation of democracy in Iraq". I've written on this before, and the short version is that the democratization argument was propounded by both the administration and the prominent ideological influences on this administration, both before the war and after - in fact, even before 9/11. (see the linked posts for extensive details) In the short view centering solely on Iraq, it is indeed arguable that we have no national interest in whether Iraq is a democracy or a non-threatening "Shiite-dominated government". But the short view is inadequate. Our problem prior to the war in Iraq was not just Iraq - a fact that Strafor acknowledges by saying that Iraq was simply a staging ground for follow-on operations against Al Qaeda and a means of pressuring neighboring nations. Stratfor accepts the long term needs, but rejects Iraq as anything more than a short term means to an end. I disagree. As was stated by the directors of Project for a New American Century... [Our challenge] is to promote democracy in the Arab world as an antidote to radical Islam.We cannot promote that democracy until there actually is a wedge - a foothold - of democracy. Unless and until that happens, the Arab world will always regard democracy as a western practice, that is "incompatable with Islam". Whether it was Iraq or another nation, we have a vital interest in achieving democracy in the Middle East, lest we always suffer the consequences of Middle Eastern totalitarianism and propaganda. So, yeah....we have a national security interest. But Stratfor does make one interesting point in this discussion on possible outcomes.... Iraq should then be encouraged to develop a Shiite-dominated government, the best guarantor against al Qaeda and the greatest incentive for the Iranians not to destabilize the situation. The fate of the Sunnis will rest in the deal they can negotiate with the Shia and Kurds -- and, as they say, that is their problem.It's a point worth remembering. Even if we fail to balance the various Iraqi factions in a functioning democracy, there is still the Shiite majority - and that is quite a roadblock to Al Qaeda. There's a great deal more to the Stratfor piece, too. I'll try to come back to it later, but I thought these points were worth making now. |
Jon, I look forward to reading your further thoughts on this. I think what many miss is how uncharted the waters were after 9/11. Going to war is never "a great idea" and the campaign strategy for conducting a large campaign is always a matter of selecting and organizing the best bad ideas among all the even worse possible ideas offered.
Going to war against non-state, cell-based, combatants with opaque ties to numerous other states including physical space (training camps, HQ/operations/planning "apartments", ...), finances, recruiters, ..., presented war planners with a new problem with no clear solutions. Even the legal framework was ill-suited for responding.
Iraq's importance was not only its geo-strategic location, although it is hard to overstate Iraq's importance from that aspect of the campaign. But it was also had significance in other areas. Afghanistan was analogous to our WWII North Africa campaign, whereas Iraq was D-Day at Normandy.
I agree with you that democratization is an important goal in attacking on of terrorism's centers of gravity. But we seem to have idealized how democratization is often achieved. For example, Germany, Japan and South Korea were run by military "governors" for years if not decades. What is important in Iraq is whose guiding hand influences the long term process, either toward democratization or toward some other form.
An Iraq hostile to, or at least unsupportive of, anti-Western Islamic terrorism (whether predominately Sunni/Whabbi or Shia) is a measure of success. However, an anti-Western Shia state is no victory over an anti-Western Sunni one. The next 9/11, a worse one, could easily come from a non-AQ aligned terror group. It is not a war solely on AQ for that reason.
Posted by: Tim at May 19, 2004 09:07 AM