QandOQuestions and Observations |
||
|
||
| Comments | ||
|
Which is, I think, exactly what the President and his people figured would happen. Gee, much more of this stuff, and even the left is going to have to figure that the President actually knows what it is he's doing. Nahh...... They'll still deny it. Posted by: Bithead at June 26, 2004 03:00 PM |
||
|
Sadr's "cease-fire" probably has a lot more to do with the US devastation of his gang than anything else. It's a good bet that US forces won't be screwing around this week -- and the "Mahdi Army" has been slaughtered enough, methinks. We wiped the ground with them in the south, where most were probably glad to see them dead -- but I doubt whether Sadr's image could withstand such humiliating defeat right in front of the home crowd. And don't hold your breath for an insightful, clear report from Iraq revealing any traction the transition strategy is acquiring. With the usual stew of explosions and over-reported (as in repeated within news cycles to the point of confusion, a media malady unique to the Iraq war) casualties, the general public will be as misinformed to the negative side this week as they have been all along, save for about 1 month following the fall of Baghdad. Posted by: IceCold at June 26, 2004 11:09 PM |
||
|
Juan Cole thinks the reason for the pullback is al-Sadr’s realization that the Americans have handed him unexpected political power:
Some are calling the First Armored Division’s campaign a victory over al-Sadr, but their original task in April was to capture or kill him. It looks to me like he comes out on top. The Sadrist militiamen killed by our forces were expendable, from al-Sadr’s point of view. He can reconstitute his militia at will, and is probably doing so right now. Three months ago, al-Sadr was a young, not particularly well-thought-of cleric, the son of a good family but with a checkered past and few prospects. Now, thanks to us, he has a shot at running the country half a year from now. IceCold says “I doubt whether Sadr's image could withstand such humiliating defeat right in front of the home crowd,” but in the home crowd’s eyes everyone knows how powerful the Americans are and no one is expected to defeat them, yet al-Sadr and his little militia stood up to them longer than Saddam’s entire army. They way they see it, it's the Americans who were humiliated. Those of us old enough to remember Vietnam know that if you don’t understand the local politics, and if you persist in viewing an alien culture through western eyes, you can win every battle and still lose the war. Posted by: Jody at June 27, 2004 07:59 PM |
||
|
Jody: Good points, but you must also remember that his militia men weren't just being picked off by US troops ... they were being killed by Iraqis who were flat tired of his foolishness in Najif. My guess he pulled back because Sistanni (or however you spell his name) got into him good and flat told him too. I know that when al-Sadar met with Sistanni, he was given the basic "Dutch Uncle" talking too. It may be that al-Sadar is now a little less pugnacious and much more humble a) because his militia lost to the US at about a 1500 to 1 ratio, b) Iraqis were also killing his militia memebers and c) the REAL clergy read him the riot act (Sistanni told him he'd have to face the charges against him). Posted by: McQ at June 27, 2004 08:20 PM |
||
|
Well, like you said, McQ, this will be interesting to watch. Either al-Sadr will rise to political power on the strength of his stand against the Americans, or he won’t. We will know in half a year. You’re right about the "real clerics" wanting him out of their towns, to the point of ratting his fighters out to the Americans or even shooting them. Sistani & Co were losing tens of millions on the disrupted pilgrim trade. I think they ran him out because what he was doing was bad for business, not that they didn't admire his stand against the Americans. And I still don’t think the 1500 martyred militiamen broke his heart. His popular base is Sadr City, which we most often hear referred to as just one neighborhood in Baghdad. But that one ‘hood has a population larger than all but the two or three largest US cities. There’s plenty more where the 1500 came from, and their willingness to die is a military asset, not to be dismissed. The Washington Post has a great story on the 1st Armored Division operation against al-Sadr; the article that Wretchard, over at Belmont Club, refers to at the link in my previous post. It’s a fascinating and revealing story, and Wretchard’s comment on the media element is good. But read all the way to the end of the Post story. The last four paragraphs: No one is certain exactly how many Sadr militants remain, although division intelligence officers say there are no more than several hundred. Dempsey said he never formally agreed to a cease-fire, and said he could not be sure that the fighters who survived would not regroup. Nonetheless, he defended the timing of the decision to stop fighting. Muqtada’s militia has learned how to fight the Americans for a political gain, even knowing they can’t win militarily. They have gone home to Sadr City. 1AD learned how to crush the uprising without doing too much collateral damage, and did so in a brilliant campaign. They have gone home to Germany. I think we might be looking back a year from now and thinking we probably should have just gone ahead and killed Muqtada al-Sadr when we had him down. Posted by: Jody at June 27, 2004 10:44 PM |
||