QandO

August 04, 2004

The Dangerous rush to Intelligence reform
Posted by McQ

John Kerry has criticized President Bush saying he “rushed to war”. There are very few who’d call a 12 month process which involved the Congress and the UN a “rush” but then words and meaning have a tendency to get twisted a bit in the heat of political rhetoric. But it was clear that Kerry felt Bush should have taken a much more considered approach than the one he did.

Yet now we have candidate Kerry wanting to rush into intelligence reform. Essentially Kerry, who can’t have read, much less digested, the 567 page 9/11 Commission report, is now calling for all their recommendations to be immediately implemented.

Shades of the Patriot Act which he now decries. One wonder if Kerry ever learns from such things.

The intelligence problem is one which has to be addressed, no question. I don’t think you’ll find anyone who will argue with you about that. Essentially the task is to take an intelligence apparatus which was focused and structured to contend with the Cold War and the Soviet Union and completely refocus it on the threat of terrorism, fundamental Islam and all that entails.

Not an easy task. And certainly not one which should be rushed into. This reform must change our system from an intelligence apparatus which eschewed HUMINT and relied on SIGINT, satellites and other high-tech methods of monitoring the USSR to one which now must employ HUMINT, network with law enforcement, include financial intelligence and share information as it never has before. That's a monumental restructuring effort.

Before we get into a discussion about how abysmal our intelligence has been and how it should be fixed, it might be useful to look at what’s happened there since 9/11. It hasn’t all been talk and tesitmony:

There are some hopeful signs. Allen says he has seen "fairly phenomenal" progress since 9/11 on threat reporting. Intelligence on potential terrorists now flows quickly through the system, he adds. Agencies are finally getting serious about common databases and communications. "I've done more sharing in the last two years than in the last 10," boasts a senior CIA analyst. At the FBI, the "wall" that separated national security investigations from criminal ones is down, and CIA officers now work on most of the FBI's terrorism task forces. The Defense Department's classified SIPRNET system, used by the military and U.S. embassies worldwide, is coming to the CIA soon and should help wire its analysts into a broader world.

This is news which is important ... why its not out there as much as it should be is a mystery. Its not like the intelligence community doesn’t understand there’s a problem and doesn’t have a desire to fix it. As you can see above, on a tactical level, it appears there’s been good progress on one of the biggest failures ... sharing information. That’s a big step, and that’s good news.

Its on the strategic level where intelligence needs its largest fix. In its orientation and its organization. One of the most consistent calls has been for an Intelligence Czar, or a chief of intelligence, if you will, who’s job it will be to coordinate, manage and produce timely and actionable intelligence from all of the many intelligence agencies.

An overall intelligence czar is not a new concept. In fact, in theory, that’s the way it is supposed to work now, absent the FBI. Nominally, the Director of the CIA also wears the hat of DCI or Director of Central Intelligence. If that's so, then why hasn’t it worked up to now?

Numerous reasons, but the two most important are budgetary control and real authority. When your agency isn’t dependent on the DCI for its funding and there are no real consequences for ignoring his or her guidance, its not a large leap to understand that you really don’t have to pay that much attention to him. And that’s precisely why it hasn’t worked until this time.

Another important reason is there’s been no sense of urgency to make it work. 911, of course, changed that.

We got along before even though we suffered some spectacular intelligence failures, such as not knowing the Soviet Union was failing and missing the development of nukes by Pakistan and India. Somehow those failures weren’t enough to warn us of our deep intelligence gathering problems. Unfortunately, it took 9/11 to slam that message home.

So what are we trying to put under the auspices of an Intelligence Czar?

Presently, there are 15 organizations engaged in intelligence work or with intellgence units. All of them supposedly come under the limited authority of the DCI. However in reality, the DCI has little if any contol over these agencies:

1. FBI: National Security Division, responsible for thwarting foreign spies and terrorists in the US.

2. Department of Homeland Security: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate charged with analyzing terrorism and other threats in the US.

3. Department of Treasury: Office of Intelligence Support which collects and analyzes data that affect US fiscal and monetary policy.

4. Coast Guard: Intelligence organization aimed at safeguarding the 95,000 miles of US coastline.

5. State Department: Bureau of Intelligence and Research which analyzes foreign intelligence drawn from other sources and US diplomatic missions abroad.

6. Department of Energy: Intelligence unit analyzes issues related to foreign nuclear weapons, weapons non-proliferation and energy security.

7. National Security Agency: Collects and analyzes overseas electronics communications (phone calls, radio transmissions, etc.) and runs the nation’s codes and cryptography efforts. Under direct authority of the Dept. of Defense.

8. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency: Imaging and maps from satellites, aircraft and other means. Under direct authority of the Dept. of Defense.

9. National Reconnaissance Office: Builds and operates the US’s spy satellites. Under direct authority of the Dept. of Defense.

10. Defense Intelligence Agency: Provides intelligence on foreign armed forces, weapons systems and military strategies. Under direct authority of the Dept. of Defense.
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11- 14. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Intelligence: Each military branch collects and processes intelligence focused heavily on tactical military operations. Under direct authority of the Dept. of Defense.

15. CIA: Collects foreign intelligence, runs covert operations, provides reports and analysis on national security topics.

Two important things to note about this list. First, the agencies listed in 7-14 all are under the direct control of the Department of Defense and many of the others are under the direct control of other cabinet level agencies. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the structure lends itself more to a traditional Cold War enemy such as the USSR instead of one which addresses the present threat: stateless terrorism.

Addressing point one. As mentioned, we presently have an Intelligence Czar. He’s the DCI or Director of Central Intelligence. However his problem is while he has nominal responsibility for overall intelligence, he has no authority or budgetary power. The Defense Department has over 80% of the intelligence budget with the other 20% split between agencies. With no power over the budget (he can’t prioritize the intelligence effort) and no real authority (his requests can be denied or ignored by heads of the other cabinet level agencies), his efforts are doomed to failure.

If the plan is to go with an intelligence czar, it is critical that both the budget authority and the authority to prioritize collection and analysis be under that person’s control. In my opinion, its unworkable any other way.

Point two. A complete restructuring, or at least refocusing, of the intelligence apparatus is required. While its good for the DIA to know what foreign militaries are doing, it is less critical now than knowing what terrorists are doing. The restructuring must include identifying agencies which are providing redundant products, identifying needs which aren’t being addressed and standing up a system which eliminates that redundancy, fills the holes in the intelligence gathering effort and streamlines the reporting, analysis and sharing.

A tall order. And certainly not one which should be cobbled together in a rush to satisfy political expediency of an election. This is serious business. I can only hope that it will be treated that way, looked at critically and changed when a real plan is ready to be implemented.

UPDATE: The Boston Globe reports that many of the intelligence community see real problems with one of the 9/11 Commission's recommendation:

Intelligence officials were particularly opposed to the commission's plan to have the nation's 15 intelligence agencies remain in their current departments while answering both to their secretaries and, simultaneously, to a new intelligence chief who would control their budgets.

Voicing concern that such a two-boss arrangement would be unwieldy, John Brennan, director of the CIA's Terrorist Threat Integration Center, urged a Senate committee not to move too quickly lest it do more harm than good.

''Are the recommendations of 9/11 workable, are they doable in totality?" Brennan asked. ''I don't think they are. I don't think we would do a service to this nation if we took these as they're stated and ran with them with haste.

''I just don't think there is sufficient engineering, design, consideration of all the complexities here."

I agree with those who oppose the "two bosses" scenario. Common sense 101.

You can't work for two bosses, and somewhere you have to choose. The one chose will be the one who pays them and can fire them.

The fact that the commission made this sort of recommendation certainly lends credence to the argument that this sort of restructuring shouldn't be rushed into without considering a number of alternatives to the commission's recommendations.

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